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In this note, we show that labour market integration can be a double-edged sword. In the 
presence of local human capital externalities, integration and the ensuing agglomeration of 
skilled labour can cause a decline in human capital and the total wage sum (net of education 
costs). In particular, integration depresses the incentives for some talented but immobile 
individuals to become skilled. 
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According to the conventional wisdom, labour market integration promotes overall eﬃ-
ciency. Integration enables mobile skilled workers to get employed where they are most
productive, and induces agglomeration of skill-intensive industries, thereby enhancing
aggregate income. In this note we qualify this line of reasoning. We show that in the
presence of local human capital externalities, labour market integration and the ensuing
agglomeration of skilled workers can cause a decline in human capital and the total wage
sum (net of education costs). In particular, agglomeration reduces the incentives for
some talented but immobile individuals to invest in education.
Thus integration aﬀects not only the location of human capital, but also its overall
stock. This feature distinguishes our note from the literature on the new economic
geography, which considers total human capital as given when analysing the implications
of integration (e.g., the recent papers Gallo, 2010; Pﬂüger and Südekum, 2008). By
endogenising human capital formation, our approach is somewhat closer to that in the
literature on the brain drain, which explores how the opportunity of emigrating to rich
countries aﬀects human capital in poor countries (e.g., Stark et al., 1998). Our focus
is diﬀerent, however: we are interested in the impact of integration and the ensuing
agglomeration on two ex-ante identical regions, and analyse the implications for overall
welfare in the two regions together.
2 The Model
Regions and Industries Consider two ex-ante identical regions, each with a pop-
u l a t i o no fu n i t y . I ne a c hr e g i o n ,ac o n t i n u u mo fs y m m e t r i cﬁrms in the interval [0,1]
produces a high-quality good with skilled workers only. The production technology is
characterised by constant returns-to-scale at the ﬁrm level and increasing returns to scale
1at the regional industry level. More precisely, the output of ﬁrm k in region i is
y
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i and Hi, Hi =
R 1
0 hk
idk, denote the number of skilled workers employed by ﬁrm
k in region i and the regional human capital stock, respectively. Regional productivity
A(Hi) is a positive, increasing and strictly concave function of the human capital em-
ployed in the regional industry, i.e., A(0) > 0, ∂A(H)/∂Hi > 0,a n d∂2A(Hi)/∂H2
i < 0.
The product’s world market price is normalised to unity. Then proﬁt maximisation
implies that the regional skilled wage wi equals each ﬁrm’s marginal product A(Hi),
which is exogenous from the perspective of a single ﬁrm. The resulting inverse aggregate







is an increasing and concave function (see Figure 1). These properties stem from a
human capital externality and set the stage for a simple agglomeration mechanism.
















Figure 1a) Non-Integrated Economy 
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Figure 1b) Integrated Economy 
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2Individual Characteristics and Options Individuals diﬀer in their ability and mo-
bility. Ability is captured by individual education costs, i.e., the costs of becoming a
skilled worker. Let c
j
i denote the education costs of native j of region i,a n dl e tu s
assume that these education costs c
j
i are uniformly distributed in the interval [0,c],
c>A (Hi)|Hi=2.1
We further assume that γ natives of each region are perfectly mobile and can move
to the other region at no cost, with γ ∈ (0,1). By contrast, (1−γ) natives are perfectly
immobile and will never leave their home region. The distribution of education costs is
the same across the mobile and immobile groups.
Individuals make two decisions. Firstly, each individual chooses whether to become
skilled or not. While skilled individuals can work for ﬁrms and earn wage income,
unskilled individuals are not employable and cannot receive any income (and thus will
be ignored in the following). Secondly, if labour markets are integrated, each individual
chooses whether to stay in their home region or to migrate to the other region.
3 Education, Migration, and Labour Markets
Non-Integrated Labour Markets Consider the benchmark case of non-integrated
labour markets. Then, individuals can decide on their education only. Native j of region
i will become skilled if and only if the skilled wage wi exceeds the individual education
costs c
j
i, i.e., wi ≥ c
j




⇔ wi = cSi.( 3 )
Jointly, the supply function (3) and the demand function (2) determine the stable
1The assumption c>A (Hi)|Hi=2 ensures that some individuals remain unskilled.













i .( 4 )
Integrated labour markets Next, consider the case of integrated labour markets.
There exists an agglomeration equilibrium with a high-wage (‘winning’) region and a low-
wage (‘losing’) region, referred to as region 1 and 2:t h a ti s ,w1 >w 2. Since moving to the
winning region enables individuals to reap higher returns on human capital, education
and migration choices are now intertwined, with the decision on education depending on
both ability and mobility.
Mobile natives of the losing region will move to the high-wage region if they are
skilled, and will thus base their education decision on the skilled wage in the winning
region. That is, mobile individual j of region 2 will become skilled if and only if the
wage w1 exceeds the education costs c
j
2, i.e., w1 ≥ c
j
2. Thus, the skilled labour supply of
immigrants in the winning region is M = γw1/c. In contrast to the mobile individuals,
immobile individuals of the losing region stay put. They will become skilled if and only
if the wage w2 exceeds their education costs c
j
2,i . e . ,w2 ≥ c
j
2. Overall, the number
of skilled workers native to the losing region is S2 =[ γw1 +( 1− γ)w2]/c,o fw h o m
S2 − M =( 1− γ)w2/c stay in region 2.
In the winning region, individuals have no incentive to leave, and the domestic labour
supply function of the natives remains the same as in the case of non-integrated mar-
kets, i.e., S1 = w1/c. Thus the aggregate supply in the winning region is S1 + M =
2The stability of the equilibrium follows directly from the concavity of the demand function (2) and
the linearity of the supply function (3).
4(1 + γ)w1/c. To sum up,






(S1 + M) and (5)






(S2 − M).( 6 )
The demand for skilled labour in each region is still given by (2). Jointly, the regional








































2 .( 8 )
Comparison Labour market integration and human capital externalities trigger the
agglomeration of skilled labour, boosting productivity and the skilled wage in the winning
region. As a result, the incentive to invest in education increases not only for the natives
of region 1, but also for the mobile natives of region 2, who can easily move to the
high-wage region. The share of skilled workers among these groups increases from w∗
i/c
to w∗∗
1 /c, and more skilled workers are employed in the winning region.
In the losing region, the outﬂow of human capital depresses productivity and the
skilled wage. Consequently, fewer immobile natives ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to become skilled,
and the share of skilled workers among them drops from w∗
i/c to w∗∗
2 /c.T h u s , f e w e r
skilled individuals work in the losing region. Importantly, agglomeration distorts the
education decision. Talented but immobile natives shy away from education, whereas
more of the less talented but mobile individuals become skilled.
4 Impact on Human Capital and the Wage Sum
We are now able to assess the overall impact of integration on total human capital
H1+2 = H1 + H2 and the total wage sum W1+2 = w1H1 + w2H2. There is no need to
5consider the net wage sum, i.e., the wage sum minus education costs, separately because
the net wage sum exactly equals one half of the wage sum.3 Our comparison of the stable
equilibrium in the benchmark case and the agglomeration equilibrium is summarised in
Proposition 1 Labour market integration leads to one of the following three outcomes:
(i) Total human capital increases, i.e., H∗∗
1+2 ≥ H∗
1+2. Then, the total wage sum also
rises, i.e., W∗∗
1+2 >W ∗





1+2. (iii) The total wage sum decreases, i.e.,
W∗∗
1+2 ≤ W∗
1+2. Then, human capital also declines, i.e., H∗∗
1+2 <H ∗
1+2.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If agglomeration causes a substantial productivity gain and wage rise in region 1
relative to the losses in region 2, then integration strengthens the overall incentives to
invest in education, and total human capital grows. If this happens, the total wage sum
surges for sure, and so does the net wage sum. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 2a,
with an almost linear productivity function A(H).
Importantly, the (net) wage sum may increase even if human capital declines. So we
cannot infer from the fact that there are fewer skilled people that there are no overall
beneﬁts from agglomeration. In this scenario, the wage rise for some individuals not only
compensates for the loss of others, but also makes up for the fall in the total number of
skilled workers.
However, if the wage decline in region 2 is suﬃciently drastic relative to the im-
provement in region 1, the (net) wage sum will decrease, and such a drop will always be
accompanied by a decrease in human capital. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 2b,
which shows a strongly curved productivity function A(H).
3As education costs of those who become skilled are uniformly distributed in the interval [0,w i],t h e
average education costs of skilled workers is 0.5wi.

























Our second proposition sums up how mobility aﬀects the beneﬁts from agglomeration.
Proposition 2 There exists a critical value γcrit < 1 such that integration boosts total





Proof. See the Appendix.
Integration will always generate overall gains if individuals are suﬃciently mobile:
that is, if enough individuals are able to join the winners. However, these overall beneﬁts
conceal severe distributional conﬂicts. The larger the share γ of mobile individuals is, the
greater the income gains of those employed in the winning region, but also the greater
the income losses of those working in the losing region.
5C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The outlook for the losing region would be less gloomy if skilled workers emigrated with
a probability smaller than one, as is often assumed in the literature on brain drain (e.g.,
Stark and Wang, 2002). This modiﬁcation would dilute the impact of integration, but it
7would not change the eﬀects qualitatively. Still, labour market integration can depress
human capital and total labour income. As argued, a decline in human capital itself does
not necessarily indicate that the total wage sum has also fallen. The complex picture that
emerges from even such a simple model cautions against simple policy recommendations.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Part (i): First, we show that H∗∗
1+2 >H ∗
1+2 is possible.






2 , H>H ∗∗
1 ,a n dc>d +2 δ (see Figure 2b). Then, H∗
1+2 =2 d/(c − δ),
H∗∗
1 =[ ( 1+γ)d]/[c − (1 + γ)δ],a n dH∗∗
2 =[ ( 1− γ)d]/[c − (1 − γ)δ], implying that
H∗∗
1+2 >H ∗
1+2 ⇔ γ2δc>0. Finally, we can slightly manipulate A(Hi) such that A(Hi) is
strictly concave and still yields H∗∗
1+2 >H ∗
1+2.
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1+2. Second, we show that W∗∗
1+2 <W ∗
1+2 is possible.
Comparing equilibrium values yields w∗∗
1 >w ∗
i >w ∗∗





i − η,w i t hε>0 and 0 <η<w ∗
i.B y c h o o s i n g A(H) appropriately, ε
can be inﬁnitesimally small. Moreover, H∗∗




i ,a n d
8H∗∗
2 < (1 − γ)H∗
i follows from (4), (7), and (8). Thus, lim
ε→0 w∗∗
1 H∗∗





2 < (1 − γ)(w∗
i − η)H∗















1+2. But then, we can slightly manipulate A(H) such that w∗∗new
1 = w∗∗
1 + μ
( w i t ha ni n ﬁnitesimally small μ), W∗∗new
1+2 >W ∗∗
1+2 = W∗
1+2, and still H∗∗new
1+2 <H ∗
1+2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :As w∗∗
1 >w ∗
i,w ec a nw r i t ew∗∗
1 = w∗
i +ε, ε>0.J o i n t l yw i t h
H∗∗
1 > (1+γ)H∗
i , this leads to W∗∗
1+2 > (1 + γ)(w∗
i + ε)H∗












i + ε) < 1,w e
can conclude that for all ε>0, ∃γcrit < 1:W∗∗
1+2 >W ∗
1+2 for all γ ≥ γcrit.
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